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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a judgment in a civil matter not involving domestic 
relations. Plaintiffs appeal was to the Utah Supreme Court, and was transferred to 
this Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant was improperly denied a renewal of her business license upon a 
determination by the City that she no longer resided in her home for the purpose of 
the City Home Occupation ordinance. Factual findings will be upheld if based on 
substantial evidence. Clements v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 893 P.2d 1078 (Utah App. 
1995). The interpretation of ordinances is a legal matter, to be reviewed for 
correctness. Alliant Techsvstem. Inc. v. Tax Com'n. 2003 UT App 374, 80 P.3d 582 
(Utah App. 2003). This matter was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Memorandum 
on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 83-97). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES WHICH MAY 
BE DISPOSITIVE 
Revised Ordinances of West Point City 2000 
§17-17- 2 Home Occupations. Uses classified as Home Occupations may be 
allowed by conditional use permit in all zones. The following shall apply to 
all major home occupations. 
"(1) The use shall be conducted primarily in the dwelling site and 
carried on by the inhabitants thereof and no others." 
§17-17-4 General Conditions. The following conditions shall apply to all 
home occupations: 
"(2) the owner of the Home Occupation Business must dwell within the 
dwelling." 
41-la-202. U.C.A. Definitions - Vehicles exempt from registration 
Registration of vehicles after establishing residency. 
(1) In this section: 
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(a) ''Domicile" means the place: 
(i) where an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal 
establishment; 
(ii) to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and 
(iii)in which the individual and his family voluntarily reside, not for a 
special or temporary purpose, but with the intention of making a 
permanent home. 
(b) (i) "Resident" means any of the following: 
(A) any individual who: 
(I) has established a domicile in this state; 
(II) regardless of domicile, remains in this state for an 
aggregate period of six months or more during any 
calendar year; 
(III) engages in a trade, profession, or occupation in this 
state or who accepts employment in other that seasonal 
work in this state ans who does not commute into the state; 
(IV) declares himself to be a resident of this state for the 
purpose of obtaining a driver license or motor vehicle 
registration; or 
(V) declares himself a resident of Utah to obtain privileges 
not ordinarily extended to nonresidents, including going to 
school, or placing children in school without paying 
nonresident tuition fees; 
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(B) Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, firm, 
corporation, association, or other entity that: 
(I) maintains a main office, branch office, or warehouse 
facility in this state and that bases and operates a motor 
vehicle in this state; or 
(II) operates a motor vehicle in intrastate transportation for 
other that seasonal work. 
(ii) "Resident" does not include any of the following: 
(A) A member of the military temporarily stationed in Utah; 
(B) an out-of-state student, as classified by the institution of 
higher education, enrolled with the equivalent of seven or more 
quarter hours, regardless of whether the student engages in a 
trade, profession, or occupation in this state or accepts 
employment in this state; and 
(C) an individual domiciled in another state or a foreign country 
that: 
(I) is engaged in public, charitable, educational, or 
religious services for a government agency or an 
organization that qualifies for tax exempt status under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3); 
(II) is not compensated for services rendered other that 
expense reimbursements; and 
(III) is temporarily in Utah for a period not to exceed 24 
4 
months. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
This case arose from the denial of a business license renewal for a Home 
Occupation Business by the City of West Point. A hearing was held before the City 
Council which upheld the decision of the City Business License Officer not to renew 
the license for the year 2004. The licensee, Mrs. Derian then filed an action in the 
Second District Court contesting the City's decision. The Court, after briefing and 
oral arguments on cross Motions for Summary Judgment, rendered Summary 
Judgment for the City, on August 23,2004. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on 
September 10, 2004. On October 12, 2004, the matter was transferred to the Court 
of Appeals by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(NOTE: Plaintiff s references to the record are as numbered by the Clerk of the Court. 
As to the hearing in this matter held before the City Council on February 3, 2004, the 
transcript is not in proper order; and the reader may be confused by the pages being 
out of order). 
On or about September 9,1999 Plaintiff was awarded a conditional use permit 
and a business license for a home occupation, by the West Point City Planning 
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Commission. (R. 8) 
The action of the Planning Commission granted both a conditional use permit 
and a business license. (R. 20). 
Home occupations are licensed under §17-17-2 of the West Point City Code, 
the relevant parts of which are set forth above. At the West Point City Planning 
Commission hearing in September, 1999, Plaintiff described her business as follows: 
Mrs. Derian explained that it is a domestic service, she explained domestic 
services include serving. She explained that the girls do not do what they think 
they do, they do strictly domestic services. 
Mr. Lang responded to that and said what Black Rose Enterprises does is 
essentially a brokerage, in that Ms. Derian as the principal of Black Rose 
Enterprises, will take telephone calls or orders for the services. He said then 
she has a list of independent contractors who she would then send to perform 
the service. Mr. Lang said they are not employees, Mrs. Derian does not do 
any withholding from their pay. Mr. Lang said her business, as a brokerage 
would be done solely by her. He explained that house cleaning is performed 
by independent contractors, who are based in places other than West Point and 
will not be working out of Mrs. Derian's home. (R. 34-5) 
At all times since September 9, 1999, the home at 1822 North 3675 West in 
West Point has been owned by Dorothy Derian, and her husband. (R. 39, 57). 
In the summer of 2003, Merlene Price, West Point City Business Licensing 
Officer, expressed concern that someone other than Mrs. Derian made a payment on 
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utilities at the West Point City Hall, and indicated that they were living in the home 
(R. 28). 
Based on receiving utility payments from two people other than Mrs. Derian, 
Ms. Price caused a letter to be sent indicating that the business license would not be 
renewed for home occupation. Mrs. Price sent a follow up letter reiterating the City's 
position on December 23, 2003 (R. 28, 40, 42). 
Based on those letters, the Business License renewal was refused, an Appeal 
was taken, and an Appeal Hearing was heard before the City Council, on February 3, 
2004. That hearing resulted in the denial of the business license renewal(R. 54-65; 
24-5). 
Based on the testimony of Mrs. Derian and Mr. Stan Murdock, the City Council 
entered the following Findings of Fact: 
11. Mrs. Derian testified that her husband is living in Arizona and starting a 
new business and that she goes to Arizona frequently for, among other reasons, 
the purpose of helping her husband start the new business. She testified that 
she is sometimes gone for two weeks at a time and that she spends at least six 
months of each year at her home in West Point. Upon further examination she 
testified that she was probably in Arizona about four or five months out of each 
year and that she spent the rest of the time in her home in West Point. Mrs. 
Derian testified that the dogs that she owned had been moved to Arizona. She 
testified that no-one else answers the telephone in connection with the 
7 
operation of her business and she has telephone business calls answered on her 
cell phone while she is in Arizona. She testified that she does not vote in 
Arizona and does not file income tax in Arizona and has a Utah Drivers 
License. She acknowledged that Cassandra Adams lived in the home for a 
time, but denied that Cassandra ran the business. She testified that Mr. 
Murdock is a caretaker of her home and that she reimburses him in cash for the 
utility payments made by him. She denied that Mr. Murdock runs the business. 
12. Stan Murdock testified that he has an arrangement with Mrs. Derian to 
take care of her house while she is away and that he and his daughter have 
separate living quarters in the Derian house. He testified that he does not 
participate in the Derian Business. 
13. The Revised Ordinances of West Point City 2000 ("Ordinances") provide 
in §17-17-2(1) with respect to Home Occupation that: 
"(1) The use shall be conducted primarily in the dwelling site and 
carried on by the inhabitants thereof and no others." 
Section 17-17-4(2) of the Ordinances with respect to all Home Occupations 
states that: 
"(2) the owner of the Home Occupation Business must dwell within the 
dwelling." 
14. By her own admission, Mrs. Derian is absent from the home for four (4) 
to five (5) Months each year. 
15. Mrs. Derian does not meet the Ordinance requirement that in order to carry 
on a Home Occupation the use shall be carried on by the "Inhabitants thereof 
and that the owner of the Home Occupation business must reside in the 
dwelling. (R. 29-31). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff s business was previously licensed by the City as a Home Occupation, 
pursuant to local ordinance. The ordinance requires a person running such a business 
to reside in the home. The City Council found, after a hearing, that Plaintiff did not 
live in the home, as she spends a significant minority of her time at a second home in 
Arizona. Plaintiff maintains that she does reside in the home, and that the question 
of residence is a question of law to be determined by State law, or by a standard 
deemed appropriate by this Court. Under such a standard, her residency, and her right 
to retain her business license should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED THE RENEWAL OF HER HOME 
BUSINESS LICENSE, AS SHE REMAINS A RESIDENT OF HER HOME, AND 
RUNS HER BUSINESS FROM THERE. 
Defendant argued in the trial court that "municipal land use decisions should 
be upheld unless those decisions are arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal" (R. 
73). Defendant claimed that the City Council made a valid land use decision, and 
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that it is the duty of the courts to uphold it. That claim is not only an over-
simplification, but basically irrelevant to the actual issues between the parties. 
Plaintiff has claimed that the City Council made arbitrary and capricious findings of 
fact, and misapplied their own ordinance, construing the ordinance in a manner 
contrary to the plain meaning of the ordinance. 
The City claims the issues involve the validity of land use decisions. The 
ordinance at issue, however, uses the term "conditional use permit" interchangeably 
with the issuance of business licenses. In other words, the City Code appears to 
create a hybrid procedure in which both a conditional use permit (a land use decision) 
and a business license are granted at the same time, by the same action, as a result of 
the same ordinance, and without differentiation as to where one starts and the other 
stops. Plaintiff contends that the primary issue here is that of the issuance of a 
business license, and not a conditional use permit. At the initial hearing in which the 
license was granted, Plaintiff and her agent (Mr. Lang) set before the Planning 
Commission the parameters of the business. Telephone calls were to be directed to 
Mrs. Derian in her home, and she was to send out "independent contractors" to 
perform services at other locations. It was not necessary, or even usual, for the 
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independent contractors to go to the home of Mrs. Derian, where the business 
operations were headquartered. At the end of 2003, the City Council determined that 
there had been a major shift in the operations of Mrs. Derian, and therefore the license 
could not be renewed. They based that determination on testimony from several 
sources that Mrs. Derian no longer resided full time in the home, but spent a 
substantial minority of her time in Arizona, where her husband now resides, and 
where he is attempting to start another business. 
The evidence, and the Findings by the City Council, are that Mrs. Derian may 
spend up to four or five months of the year outside of the home. She has someone 
else in the home to take care of it when she is not there; and when she is not around 
the home, she uses her cell phone to conduct the business. The uncontroverted 
testimony is that she maintains ownership of the home, is registered to vote in Utah, 
registers her car in Utah, and carries a Utah Drivers License.(R. 57). Mrs. Derian also 
files income tax as a resident of the State of Utah, giving as her address the home in 
West Point (R. 61). Based on these facts, the City Council determined that she no 
longer "resides" in the home and therefore cannot maintain a home occupation. The 
ordinance simply requires the home occupation business owner to reside in the home, 
i i 
but does not attempt to set guidelines for the residence. Plaintiff puts forth the simple 
proposition that she must reside somewhere. If she does not reside in the home in 
West Point, where does she reside? The "plain meaning" of the term reside, or 
residence, would seem to militate in favor of the place in which she claims residency, 
pays taxes, has her drivers license, registers her car, votes and spends the majority of 
her time. 
The Utah Code defines "resident" in several different places, depending on 
usage. In §20A-1-102(62) the term is defined for voting purposes. It simply states 
that a resident is "a person who resides within a specific voting precinct in Utah." 
While that definition is on its own entirely worthless, it appears to define the Plaintiff 
in this action. She is in fact a registered voter in the City of West Point, and must 
therefore be assumed to "reside" in her voting precinct. If she did not, it appears it 
would be the duty of the County Clerk to strike her from the voting roles; and the 
County Clerk has not done so. There is a much better and more complete definition 
in the motor vehicle code, which is set forth in full above. Once again, it appears that 
Plaintiff meets all of these definitions. Clearly Plaintiff has established a fixed 
permanent home and principal business establishment. If she is absent, she intends 
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to return. She resided for more than an aggregate period of 6 months or more during 
the last calendar year, and thus cannot reside elsewhere. In other words, since she is 
in Utah a majority of the time, she cannot be elsewhere a majority of the time, and 
would not qualify to be a resident anywhere else. Thus, the finding of the City 
Council that she is not a resident, makes no factual sense, and is contrary to law. 
The City argues that its decision is based on substantial evidence, and that is 
enough to uphold it. While the City appears to cite a valid legal standard, its decision 
does not meet that standard here. In Clements v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 893 P.2d 
1078(Utah App. 1995), this Court recited just that standard. The Court reviewed the 
evidence in light of statutory standards concerning "domicile". Using the same 
factors that have been recited already in this Memorandum, the Court found that the 
Defendant was domiciled in this State. Those factors included motor vehicle 
registration, ownership of real property, possession of a Utah Drivers License, 
registration to vote in Utah, use of a Utah mailing address, and "an intent to remain 
for an indefinite period." 893 P.2d at 1081. The contacts Plaintiff has with this State 
are more than enough to show residency in the state, and in the city in which she 
owns her real property, and physically spends her time. 
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The argument made by the City in this action is that this is basically a land use 
decision, and the courts should not interfere with it. Defendant does not, however, 
raise valid land use questions here. The purpose behind home occupation ordinances 
is to allow limited business opportunities for the home owner which do not interfere 
with the residential character of the neighborhood, and do not create traffic or other 
problems for the neighbors. To suggest that the City is protecting its land use 
interests by this arbitrary and capricious re-definition of the term "reside" is without 
foundation. Certainly it attempts to impose a technologically obsolete definition of 
"reside". The City seems to think that it has some interest in seeing that the telephone 
calls received by Plaintiff are physically received while in the dwelling. The concept 
of telephones being stationary devices maintained in the home, is no longer realistic. 
Anyone and everyone conducts business in the Twenty-first century by receiving 
telephone calls on their mobile or cellular telephones, as if they were in their home 
or office. It is often nearly impossible for a caller to determine where the call is 
received, unless that information is voluntarily given by the recipient. The City has 
stated no interest, nor can it, in tying the Plaintiff down to receiving all of her 
telephone calls in her home. If she spends a majority of the year in her home, she 
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qualifies as a resident. Once she qualifies as a resident, there is no legal requirement 
that she imprison herself in her home. The City has therefore, in imposing a 
nonsensical definition of "reside" or "resident" on Plaintiff, very clearly made an 
arbitrary and capricious decision. There being no "land use" value to their decision, 
it should not be upheld. 
The trial Court granted Summary Judgment to the City in an order of only a 
little over two pages. The portion of the Order containing its legal ruling was less 
than a complete paragraph: 
. . .that the legal standard to be applied to evaluate the Decision of the City 
Council is to determine whether or not such Decision was arbitrary and 
capricious; that the appropriate standard in connection therewith is whether or 
not there is substantial evidence defined as "that quantum and quality of 
evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support the Decision"; that 
there is substantial evidence to support the Decision of West Point City. 
Specifically, there is an Ordinance stating that the holder of a Conditional Use 
Permit and Home Occupation License must reside in the dwelling. There is 
substantial evidence in the record that Plaintiff lives in Arizona four or five 
months a year. As a matter of law and matter of the evidence that does not 
constitute a "dwelling. There was substantial evidence in the record that the 
business was not conducted by the inhabitants of the dwelling as required by 
City Ordinance. (R. 119). 
The City has claimed from the beginning that this dispute is basically factual, 
and that "substantial evidence" in support of its position is dispositive. The trial court 
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cited no law in its decision and made no attempt to explain its conclusions of law. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that there is "substantial evidence" for the finding that she 
does not live in the West Point home full time, 365 days per year. This finding is 
substantially based on her own testimony. The trial court, however, also made a legal 
ruling, defining residency: "As a matter of law and matter of the evidence that does 
not constitute a "dwelling." (Emphasis added). That part of the ruling is reviewed for 
correctness. Plaintiff concedes that, in Clements this Court ruled that "domicile is a 
question of fact". 893 P.2d 1078, 1081. The legal standard on which such a factual 
finding is based, however, is a matter of law. See Alliant Techsystem, Inc. v. Tax 
Com'n. 2003 UT App 374, 80 P.3d 582 (Utah App. 2003) where the Court held that 
the interpretation of a statute was a matter of law. In this case, the trial court failed 
to enunciate on what law it relied to determine that Plaintiff was not using her home 
as a "dwelling". The West Point ordinance contains no definition. The trial court 
apparently rejected the legal definitions proffered by Plaintiff, but it did not explain 
why. Nor did it explain the basis for its decision on the meaning of "dwelling" in this 
instance, "as a matter of law". Certainly, the home which she owns and in which she 
resides a majority of the time has many (if not all) the characteristics of a "dwelling". 
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The trial court failed to state in what way it does not qualify. Because the trial court 
did not choose a legal standard, and explain why the standard sought by Plaintiff was 
incorrect, the trial court made an error of law. Likewise, the City cited no law before 
the trial court as to the legal meaning it claimed for "dwell within the dwelling". The 
city claimed that it had a free hand to use words as it chose to do, and therefore to 
make findings as it saw fit. The City of South Salt Lake made the same claim in 
Petersen v. South Salt Lake, 1999 UT 93, 987 R2d 57 (Utah 1999). In that case, the 
City sought to use several ordinances to prohibit an adult entertainment business from 
relocating. The Court reviewed each of the ordinances, and found that the meaning 
claimed by the City was incorrect. The Court, of course, reviewed the meaning of the 
ordinances under the standard of "correctness". 1999 UT 93, f 2. After determining 
that there was no prohibition of such a relocation, the Court dealt with the ordinance 
provisions which provided for a buffer between such a business and certain of its 
neighbors. The ordinance (like the present one) contained no standard for 
measurement. The Court held: "However, when a city fails to set forth the standard 
for measuring the distance requirement, a court must determine what method of 
measuring makes sense given 'the ends sought to be accomplished by [the 
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ordinance].'" 1999 UT 93, f 12. The Court determined that the method of 
measurement used by the City was not appropriate, and then determined that, under 
the correct standard, Plaintiffs business complied with the ordinance. The Court 
suggested that one factor in determining a standard was the way the ordinance had 
been used in the past. The City here makes no claim that the ordinance has been used 
on prior occasions to close a home business when someone lived elsewhere for part 
of the year. Neither did the City make a public policy argument as to the harm that 
would be done to the City if Plaintiff were allowed to continue her business as she 
had been doing. Plaintiff simply cannot grasp how her being away from her home for 
periods of time adversely affects the "land use" policies of the City. Nobody has yet 
explained it; and the trial court did not ask. Enforcing the ordinance as sought here 
by the City is truly an example of arbitrary and capricious government action, done 
without standards, and without a check on the power of the governmental entity. The 
question should not be whether there was "substantial evidence" to support the 
decision of the City, but whether it was made on the basis of a clear and valid 
standard. Since it wasn't, it should be reversed. 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. allows for summary judgment when "there is no genuine 
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issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." The person against whom the Summary Judgment Motion is filed, is 
entitled to all the inferences fairly arising from the facts, considered in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. See Wine gar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991). Plaintiff is a resident of the City of West Point, and of the home she 
owns in that City., within legal definitions promulgated by the Utah Legislature. 
Absent a clear contrary legal standard which specifically applies to this situation, 
Defendant is not entitled to Summary Judgment, because of the inferences in 
Plaintiffs favor. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court used an incorrect legal standard to review the actions of West 
Point City. Summary Judgment must be based not only on a finding that there is 
substantial evidence to support the City Council's findings, but that a correct legal 
standard was used. Because an incorrect legal standard was used, this Court must 
decide what law to apply to the facts; and that legal standard must "make sense". 
Plaintiff believes that such a procedure will result in a reversal of the judgment, and 
the reinstatement of her business license. 
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DATED this lay of March, 2005. 
W. ANDRE^MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the O ~ day of March, 2005,1 did mail two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to Felshaw 
King, Attorney for Appellee, 330 North Main Street, Kaysville, Utah 84037. 
0\xjp$fo 0 ^ ^ l o c r e t r ? 
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KING & KING 
Attorneys for West Point City 
P. O. Box 320 
330 North Main Street 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: (801)543-2288 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
DAVIS COUNTY, LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DOROTHY DERIAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
WEST POINT CITY, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 040600824 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
ooOoo 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, July 28, 2004 before 
the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Judge. The hearing was held upon Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and upon 
Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff appeared by and through her 
Attorney W. Andrew McCullough, Esq. and Defendant appeared by and through its Attorney 
Felshaw King, Esq. After having reviewed said Motions and the other files and pleadings 
herein and after having heard the arguments of Counsel the Court did find that no evidence 
* A tc- motion for summary judgm 
040600824 
DERIAN.DOROTHY 
outside the record created at the hearing before the City Council could be considered; that 
the legal standard to be applied to evaluate the Decision of the City Council is to determine 
whether or not such Decision was arbitrary and capricious; that the appropriate standard in 
connection therewith is whether or not there is substantial evidence defined as "that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support the 
Decision"; that there is substantial evidence to support the Decision of West Point City. 
Specifically, there is an Ordinance stating that the holder of a Conditional Use Permit and 
Home Occupation Business License must reside in the dwelling. There is substantial 
evidence in the record that Plaintiff lives in Arizona four or five months a year. As a matter 
of law and matter of the evidence that does not constitute "dwelling". There was substantial 
evidence in the record that the business was not conducted by the inhabitants of the dwelling 
as required by City Ordinance. 
Based upon the files and records herein the Court finds that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that as a matter of law Defendant is entitled Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiffs 
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice; 
KING & KING 
LAWYERS 
330 NORTH MAIN 
PO BOX 320 
KAYSVILLE UTAH 84037 
KING & KING 
LAWYERS 
330 NORTH MA/N 
PO BOX 320 
KAYSVILLE UTAH 84037 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby DENIED. 
DATED this £fejday of August, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
THOMAS IUCAY 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on August 11,2004, I caused to be mailed, 
pursuant to the terms of Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct 
copy of the proposed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
W. Andrew McCullough, Esq. 
McCullough & Associates, L.L.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
6885 South State Street, Suite 200 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
DATED this 11th day of August, 2004. 
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